«Η συμφωνία για αλλαγή ονόματος της Μακεδονίας είναι ένας θρίαμβος για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, αλλά ανησυχητική για τη Δημοκρατία», είναι ο τίτλος του άρθρου του TIME για τη Συμφωνία των Πρεσπών.
Το αμερικανικό περιοδικό αποδομεί με επιχειρήματα τη Συμφωνία των Πρεσπών και προειδοποιεί παράλληλα για τους σοβαρούς κινδύνους που δημιουργεί η επικύρωσή της.
[Πριν αλέκτορα φωνήσαι τρις απαρνήση
με:Πράγματι ο Ζάεφ απεκάλεσε τη βόρεια Μακεδονία απλά Μακεδονία. Η
Τουρκία επίσης και πάει λέγοντας…Οι συνέπειες μιας Συμφωνίας που δεν
έπρεπε να γίνει έχουν αρχίσει να γίνονται ορατές με το καλημέρα. Ισως η
μεγαλύτερη ιστορικά προδοσία της Αριστεράς στην Ελλάδα…]
Το γνωστό αμερικανικό περιοδικό (με κυκλοφορία 2.500.000 αντιτύπων διεθνώς) επισημαίνει ότι μετά τη διάλυση της Γιουγκοσλαβίας το 1991, ο βόρειος γείτονας της Ελλάδας πήρε το όνομα «Μακεδονία», αλλά η Αθήνα αρνήθηκε να το αναγνωρίσει, λέγοντας ότι νομιμοποιεί τις εδαφικές διεκδικήσεις στη βόρεια ελληνική επαρχία της Μακεδονίας.
«Για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση»,
συνεχίζει λίγο πιο κάτω η ανάλυση, «η Συμφωνία των Πρεσπών είναι
ταυτόχρονα μια γεωπολιτική νίκη και μια δικαίωση του οράματός της για το
πώς πρέπει να λειτουργεί η διεθνής πολιτική».
Ωστόσο, όπως επισημαίνει, υπάρχουν τρία προβλήματα με το αφήγημα αυτό.
Το πρώτο, σύμφωνα με το TIME, είναι ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση
«διάλεξε να αγνοήσει προβληματικές πτυχές μιας διαδικασίας επικύρωσης
που αμφισβήτησε τους συνταγματικούς κανόνες και τις αρχές του κράτους
δικαίου τόσο στη Μακεδονία όσο και στην Ελλάδα».
Όπως εξηγεί, για να περάσει η συμφωνία
και στα δύο κοινοβούλια «χρειάστηκε πολιτικό παζάρι που έφτασε στα όρια
της νομιμότητας».
Χαρακτηριστικά αναφέρει ότι ο Ζόραν Ζάεφ
για να περάσει τη συμφωνία από το δικό του κοινοβούλιο χρησιμοποίησε
απειλές για δικαστικές διώξεις, αλλά και έναν αμφιλεγόμενο νόμο για
πολιτική αμνηστία, ενώ ασκήθηκαν μεγάλες πιέσεις και από ξένες
κυβερνήσεις.
Για τον Αλέξη Τσίπρα,
σημειώνει ότι για να περάσει τη συμφωνία στηρίχθηκε σε βουλευτές που
ήταν αντίθετοι σε αυτή, αλλά «δελεάστηκαν με την υπόσχεση κυβερνητικών
θέσεων», ενώ αναφέρει και τις καταγγελίες εναντίον του Αλέξη Τσίπρα ότι «ανακατεύεται με το δικαστικό σώμα, τα Μέσα Ενημέρωσης και το στρατό».
Το δεύτερο πρόβλημα που αναδεικνύει το έγκριτο αμερικανικό περιοδικό είναι ότι «και οι δύο κυβερνήσεις περνάνε τη Συμφωνία των Πρεσπών ενάντια στη βούληση μεγάλου μέρους της χώρας τους».
Θυμίζει δε ότι όλες οι δημοσκοπήσεις στην Ελλάδα
«δείχνουν ισχυρή λαϊκή πλειοψηφία ενάντια στη συμφωνία», ενώ
υπογραμμίζει ότι «η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση μοιάζει ξανά να εμφανίζεται ως μια
γραφειοκρατία που προτιμά να αγνοεί τις λαϊκές αντιδράσεις και την
κυριαρχία των πιο αδύναμων κρατών».
Το τρίτο πρόβλημα είναι
ότι «ακόμα και ο γεωπολιτικός στόχος της σταθεροποίησης της περιοχής
κινδυνεύει από τη συμφωνία, ακριβώς επειδή το πολιτικό μίγμα στην Ελλάδα
και τη Μακεδονία είναι τόσο ασταθές».
Μάλιστα, υποστηρίζει ότι στη γειτονική
μας χώρα η αλλαγή ονόματος «υποστηρίζεται από ένα συνασπισμό μιας
μειοψηφία της κυρίαρχης σλαβομακεδονικής εθνοτικής ομάδας και την εθνοτική Αλβανική μειονότητα, ενώ είναι αντίθετη η πλειοψηφία των Σλαβομακεδόνων.
Με άλλα λόγια, η Συμφωνία
βάζει ένα συνασπισμό μειονοτήτων απέναντι στην πλειοψηφία της
πλειοψηφίας. Ένα τέτοιο σκηνικό θα ανάψει και πάλι τις εθνοτικές
εντάσεις και θα αυξήσει την πολιτική πόλωση στη Μακεδονία».
Το TIME ολοκληρώνει την αποδόμηση της Συμφωνίας των Πρεσπών ως εξής: «Σε μια περίοδο με σοβαρά προβλήματα στο κράτος δικαίου σε ορισμένα κράτη-μέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και λαϊκές αναταραχές σε άλλα, μια τέτοια προσέγγιση στα προβλήματα της Ευρώπης είναι κοντόφθαλμη και αυτοκαταστροφική».
Ολόκληρο το άρθρο του TIME στα αγγλικά:
Macedonia’s Name Change Deal Is a Triumph for the E.U., But Worrying for Democracy
Last June, in the picturesque lake
region of Prespes, Greece and Macedonia seemed to set aside decades of
hostility, as leaders from both countries signed an accord to rename the
former Yugoslav republic. Under that eponymous agreement, signed in the
presence of European and U.N. officials, Macedonia will become the
Republic of North Macedonia. And now, after six months of trying to
secure approval by both parliaments, a deal to resolve one of the most
intractable — and to many outside observers incomprehensible — bilateral
disputes in the Balkans is close to fruition.
After Macedonia enacted all necessary
changes in its constitution, the Prespes deal is now very close to
ratification by Greece as well, with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras
winning a vote of confidence in Athens on Jan. 16 — called because of
disagreements in his coalition over the agreement. The name-change deal
is now expected to be ratified by Greece later this week, which will
pave the way for North Macedonia’s entry to NATO and the start of
negotiations to discuss it joining the European Union.
After the disintegration of
Yugoslavia in 1991, Greece’s northern neighbor took the name
“Macedonia”—but Athens refused to recognize it, saying it gave
legitimacy to territorial claims over the northern Greek province of
Macedonia. (The U.N. calls it “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.”) The dispute has led Athens to repeatedly block its
neighbor’s attempts to join NATO and the E.U., a cause of concern for
European leaders who want to strengthen those alliances in the face of
Russian aggression.
Even though the dispute between the
two countries is centered on the legal question of the official name of a
country, it touches upon emotional issues of history and identity in
both countries. For the citizens of what will soon be “North Macedonia,”
the term “Macedonia” is a marker of their distinct national identity in
the Balkans. For Greeks on the other hand, Macedonia is intertwined
with important periods and personalities in a historical narrative that
extends back to ancient times. Under the weight of still vivid memories
of conflict and war during the 20th century, the two nations have found
it impossible to reconcile on a jointly agreed understanding and use of
the word ‘Macedonia’—until last summer. And still, the leaders of both
countries have come up against deeply entrenched nationalist attitudes.
The E.U. has supported the agreement
throughout all the stages of its negotiation, signing and ratification.
For the E.U., the Prespes deal represents all that is good about
multilateralism and the rules-based international order at a time when
these values are under attack by nationalism and populism in Europe, and
by President Donald Trump and Russia further afield. It clears a
stumbling block in its enlargement to the Western Balkans and puts back
on track its project of transforming this region by enmeshing it in its
institutional and legal order. For the E.U. the Prespes agreement then
is both a geopolitical victory and a vindication of its vision of how
international politics should work.
But there are three problems with this narrative.
Due political process
The E.U. has chosen to ignore
problematic aspects of a ratification process that has challenged
constitutional norms and rule of law principles in both Macedonia and
Greece. Because both Tsipras and Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev
have razor-thin majorities in their parliaments, pushing through the
deal in both countries has required political bargaining that has pushed
the limits of legality.
In Macedonia, Zaev, who lacked the
two-thirds majority in parliament to change Macedonia’s constitution,
used both threats of judicial prosecutions for corruption and a
questionable law of partial amnesty to induce opposition lawmakers to
vote for his constitutional amendments. Opposition MPs in Skopje were
reportedly under immense pressure by both supporters and opponents of
Prespes, including foreign governments, to vote accordingly. Each side
has accused the other of threatening physical violence or promising
bribes.
In Athens, the situation is even more
convoluted. Tsipras’s government survived the vote of no confidence in
order to ratify Prespes, but its minuscule majority relies on some
opponents of the deal, who were lured with the promise of government
jobs. Instead, Tsipras expects to ratify the agreement this week by
peeling off MPs from smaller opposition parties, potentially to be
rewarded with inclusion in the electoral lists of his party in
forthcoming elections. Tsipras has already been accused by the
opposition in recent months for undue meddling in the judiciary, media
and the army. Now, his patching up of ad hoc majorities for different
votes in parliament has challenged norms of parliamentary and
constitutional procedure and contributed to the further mistrust of the
political systems by Greek citizens.
For the E.U., concerns over rule of
law and due political process should be taken seriously—particularly at a
time when many of its member-states struggle with authoritarianism and
illiberalism. Meanwhile, all Balkan states that the E.U. hopes to
welcome one day continue suffer from persistent problems of corruption
and strongman politics. In a world defined by the struggle between
liberal democracy and populism, process matters as much as content. The
process through which Prespes is being ratified leaves a lot to be
desired.
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras
(R) and Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev raise their hands during a
signing ceremony between officials from Greece and Macedonia at Prespes
Lake on June 17, 2018.
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras
(R) and Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev raise their hands during a
signing ceremony between officials from Greece and Macedonia at Prespes
Lake on June 17, 2018. Sakis Mitrolidis—AFP/Getty Images
An unpopular deal
Second, both governments are pushing
through Prespes against the wishes of large parts of their countries. In
Macedonia, the government failed to win a consultative referendum on
Prespes in September — a vote that the E.U. has chosen to ignore. In
Greece all opinion polling shows a strong popular majority against the
deal.
Protestors have staged massive
demonstrations against the deal, including one on Sunday that was
dispersed forcefully by police and that produced images reminiscent of
the darkest days of the Eurozone crisis and the violent anti-austerity
demonstrations in Athens. Just a few months before a European Parliament
election where populists are expected to score gains, the E.U. seems
yet again to be presenting itself as a bureaucracy bent on ignoring
popular reactions and the sovereignty of weaker states.
Reigniting tensions
Finally, even the geopolitical goal
of stabilization of the region is endangered by the deal, precisely
because the political mix in Greece and Macedonia is so volatile. In
Macedonia the name-change is supported by a coalition of a minority of
the dominant Slav-Macedonian ethnic group and Macedonia’s ethnic
Albanian minority, while it is opposed by the majority of
Slav-Macedonians. In other words, the deal pits a coalition of
minorities against a majority of the majority. Such an arrangement is
bound to reignite ethnic tensions and increase political polarization in
Macedonia—the exact opposite of the E.U.’s intention.
In Greece, on the other hand, Prespes
tarnishes public perception of the E.U., interrupting a period of slow
and painful rehabilitation after the Eurozone crisis of 2010-15. In a
country still scarred by the economic crisis and always susceptible to
populist relapses, the rekindling of nationalism by an E.U.-sponsored
deal runs against the E.U.’s interest of stability in a Eurozone
member-state.
The E.U.’s support for the Prespes
agreement flows from admirable ideals of European integration. But it is
also another example of a bureaucratized mode of governing that often
ignores political realities and popular sensibilities. Most of all, it
reflects a self-congratulatory attitude that views E.U. accession and
membership as a cure-all for complex ethnic, economic and social
problems, but also tolerates bargains with questionable national elites
and turns a blind eye to their methods as long as they achieve pro-E.U.
results on the ground. At a time of serious problems with the rule of
law in some E.U. member-states and popular upheaval in others, such an
approach to Europe’s problems is short-sighted and self-defeating.
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